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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) and Article VIII, § 3, Utah
Constitution.

This case is a consolidation of two appeals from the

Third Judicial District Court, wherein Judge David Young granted
summary judgment in favor of the respondents herein.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
For purposes of this appeal, this respondent does not
contest the statement of issues set forth in appellant's brief.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
[N]o state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law; nor deny
to any person in its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.
All political power is inherent in the people
and all free governments are founded on their
authority for their equal protection and
benefit, and they have the right to alter or
reform their government as the public welfare
may require.
Utah Const, art. I § 2.
All courts shall be open, and every person for
an injury done to him in his person, property
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law, which shall be administered without
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending
before any trial in this State, by himself or
1

counsel, in any civil cause to which he is a
party.
Utah Const, art. I § 11.
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation.
Utah Const, art. I § 24.
The provisions of this Constitution are
mandatory and prohibitory unless by express
words they are declared to be otherwise.
Utah Const, art. I § 26.
Injury due to defective design or construction
of improvement to real property — Within seven
years. —
No action to recover damages for any
injury to property, real or personal, or for
any injury to the person, or for bodily injury
or wrongful death, arising out of the defective
and unsafe condition of an improvement to real
property, nor any action for damages sustained
on account of such injury, shall be brought
against any person performing or furnishing the
design, planning, supervision of construction
or constructing of such improvement to real
property more than seven years after the
completion of construction.
(1)
"Person" shall mean an individual,
corporation, partnership, or any other legal
entity.
(2) Completion of construction for the purpose
of this act shall mean the date of issuance of
a certificate of substantial completion by the
owner, architect, engineer or other agent, or
the date of the owner's use or possession of
the improvement on real property.
The limitation imposed by this provision shall
not apply to any person in actual possession
and control as owner, tenant or otherwise, of
the improvement at the time the defective and
unsafe condition of such improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury for
which it is proposed to bring an action.
2

This provision shall not be construed as
extending or limiting the period otherwise
prescribed by laws of this state for the
bringing of any action.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal taken from Judge David S. Young's order
granting summary judgment against the plaintiff, James Sanchez, and
in favor of defendants Martin Stern, Jr. AIA & Associates, Okland
Construction Company, Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc. and Higham-Hilton
Mechanical Contractors, Inc.
Hilton

Mechanical

(For purposes of this brief, Higham-

Contractors,

Inc.,

shall

be

referred

to as

"Higham-Hilton.")

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
For purposes of this appeal, respondent Higham-Hilton
accepts the statement of facts set forth in appellant Sanchez'
brief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In the

interest

of

avoiding

unnecessary

duplication,

respondent Higham-Hilton incorporates by reference the arguments
raised

by

co-respondents

Martin

Stern,

Jr.,

AIA

Architect

&

Associates, Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc., and Okland Construction
Company with respect to the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. §
78-12-25.5.

However, Higham-Hilton
3

does

not

incorporate

such

arguments to the extent that they assert or imply that manufacturers,

suppliers, materialmen,

and

others

involved

in the

building industry are not included within the scope of the statute.
No issue of material fact exists with respect to whether
respondent Higham-Hilton falls within the scope of Utah Code Ann §
78-12-25.5.
ly

defective

Even assuming that Higham-Hilton provided the allegedsauna

heating

unit, appellant's

cause

of

action

nonetheless arises out of an allegedly defective improvement to
real property, rather than a defective "product."

Furthermore, as

mechanical contractor for the Little America project, Higham-Hilton
is expressly

included within the coverage of § 78-12-25.5, and

appellant's causes of action against it are barred.
ARGUMENT
I.

In

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5 DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE OPEN COURTS PROVISION OF
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, NOR DOES IT
VIOLATE PRINCIPLES OF DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION.
the

interest

of

brevity,

respondent

Higham-Hilton

incorporates and adopts the arguments set forth in the briefs of
respondents Martin Stern, Jr.

AIA Architect & Associates, Rocky

Mountain Pools, Inc., and Okland Construction Company concerning
the constitutionality of § 78-12-25.5.

However, Higham-Hilton does

not incorporate those arguments to the extent that they assert or
imply that manufacturers, suppliers, materialmen, and others in the
building industry do not fall within the scope of the statute.

4

Higham-Hilton submits that such an assumption is unwarranted under
the language and legislative history of the statute.
Higham-Hilton also submits that appellant Sanchez does
not have

standing to assert the rights of third parties with

respect to the constitutionality of § 78-12-25.5.

Sanchez7 sole

constitutional argument on equal protection grounds is that the
statute in question protects certain members of the construction
industry, while excepting owners and others in the industry from
its protection.

While a blanket statement as to the coverage of

the statute appears unwarranted, even if appellant were correct, he
would not have standing to assert the rights of those allegedly
disadvantaged third parties.
The inappropriateness of allowing appellant to assert
those third parties7 rights is particularly clear in this case,
given the

fact that appellant's

equal protection

argument can

prevail only if he can establish that the parties are not protected
by the statute.

If it were determined that those third parties are

indeed covered by the statute, plaintiff would be entitled to no
recovery, as each of the defendants (other than Little America)
would be protected by the statute itself.

In that regard, appel-

lant clearly does not represent the interests of the third parties,
and therefore lacks standing to raise the equal protection argument
set forth in his brief.

5

II.

NO ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS AS TO
WHETHER UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5
APPLIES TO HIGHAM-HILTON.

Appellant argues that summary judgment for Higham-Hilton
was inappropriate because a factual issue exists with respect to
Higham-Hilton's role in the construction of the Little America.
Specifically, Appellant suggests that Higham-Hilton might not fall
within the protection of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 because it
allegedly did not construct an improvement, but rather provided a
defective product.

(Brief of Appellant, pp. 28-29)

As explained

to the district court, appellant's argument centers on the theory
that

the

allegedly

defective heating

unit would

not

"fit the

definition of improvement and the statute of limitation wouldn't
apply . . . ."

(Transcript of Hearing on Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment, July 18, 1988, p. 8 ) . Assuming, for purposes of
this appeal, that Higham-Hilton provided the heating unit which
allegedly

caused

appellant's

injuries,

appellant's

argument

nonetheless fails as a matter of law.
A.

Appellant's claims arise out of an
allegedly defective "improvement to
real property."

Appellant Sanchez contends that his claims arise out of
an

allegedly

defective

assume it provided.

heating

unit, which

Higham-Hilton

will

Consequently, appellant argues, his claims

against Higham-Hilton arise out of a defective "product," and are
not governed by § 78-12-25.5.

In support of that theory, appellant

6

quotes the definition of improvement set forth in Kallas Millwork
Corp, v. Square DCo,, 66 Wis.2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975).
The court in Kallas applied what has become known as the
"common sense" test for determining what constitutes an improvement
to real property.

As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted,

"[m]ost courts in other jurisdictions, construing statutes similar
to [Ohio's] have adopted a common sense interpretation of 'improvement,' rather than employing fixture law."
Inc., 741 F.2d 111, 113 (6th Cir. 1984).

Adair v. Koppers Co.,

Under a common sense view

of the term "improvement to real property," courts have recognized
that a component integral to the operation of a larger system is
necessarily inseparable from that larger system within the meaning
of "improvement."

In this case, the heating unit is obviously an

integral and necessary part of the sauna, which unquestionably
constitutes an "improvement" under any given definition.

As such,

the heating unit itself constitutes an improvement for purposes of
§ 78-12-25.5, and claims based upon the unit are therefore governed
by the statute.
A leading case recognizing that principle is Mullis v.
Southern Company Services, Inc., 296 S.E.2d 579 (Ga. 1982).
Mullis,

the

plaintiff

was

injured

by

an

air

circuit

contained in a power company's electrical system.

In

breaker

The defendant,

who was alleged to have designed (and apparently constructed) the
electrical

system,

was

granted

summary

judgment

based

upon a

statute of repose essentially identical to Utah Code Ann. § 78-127

25.5. L

Rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the circuit breaker

was not an improvement within the meaning of the statute, the court
wrote:
The issue is whether a component of a system
which is definitely an improvement to real
property is an improvement to real property
itself. However, to artificially extract each
component from an improvement to real property
and view it in isolation would be an unrealistic and impractical method of determining what
is an improvement to real property. Frequently, as in this case, an improvement to real
property is going to consist of a complex
system of components.
Consequently, we find that if a component
is an essential or integral part of the
improvement to which it belongs, then it is
itself an improvement to real property.
Id. at 584.
A similar conclusion was reached in Cudahv Co. v. Ragnar
Benson, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Colo. 1981).

In that case, an

allegedly defective header cap within a refrigeration system caused
damage to the plaintiff's property.

1

Based upon Colorado's statute

"[Georgia] Code Ann. § 3-1006 provides as follows:
'No action to recover damages
(1) for any deficiency in the survey or plat, planning,
design, specifications, supervision or observation of construction
or construction of an improvement to real property,
(2) for injury to property, real or personal, arising out
of any such deficiency, or
(3) injury to the person or for wrongful death arising
out of any such deficiency, shall be brought against any person
performing the furnishing the survey or plat, design, planning,
supervision or observation of construction, or construction of such
an improvement more than eight years after substantial completion
of such an improvement.'11 Id. at 581.

8

of repose governing
granted

improvements

to real property,2

summary judgment to the general contractor and a sub-

contractor responsible for the refrigeration system.
noted

the court

that the size or interchangeability

The court

of the cap was not

determinative of its status under the statute.

Because the cap was

an integral component of the refrigeration system, which was itself
essential to the overall structure of the plant, the court found
that the header cap was an improvement to real property under the
statute.

Accordingly, the plaintiff's claims were held barred.
In

this

case, the

inappropriateness

of

severing

the

heating unit from the entire sauna structure is demonstrated by the
specific allegations which appellant Sanchez makes in his second
amended

complaint.

The

allegations

against

Higham-Hilton

are

hereafter reproduced in total:
(a)

Failing to build the sauna with an adequate

timing mechanism which would alert users to the amount of time they
have used the sauna;

2

"C.R.S. 1973, § 13-80-127, provides in pertinent part:
(1) All actions against any architect, contractor,
engineer, or inspector brought to recover damages for injury to
person or property caused by the design, planning, supervision,
inspection, construction, or observation of construction of any
improvement to real property shall be brought within two years
after the claim for relief arises, and not thereafter, but in no
case shall such an action be brought more than ten years after the
substantial completion of the improvement to the real property . .
." Id. at 1215.

9

(b)

Failing

to

build

the

sauna

with

adequate

warnings of side effects accompanying use of the sauna;
(c)

Failing

to

build

the

sauna

with

adequate

disclosure to the purchasers of the dangers to users in using the
sauna for an extended period of time;
(d)

Failing to build the sauna with other

safety

precautions which will become obvious through discovery.
(R.78)
Plainly,

Sanchez

claims

concern

the

entire

sauna.

Interesting is the fact that none of the allegations actually refer
to the heating unit; rather, they refer to the sauna as a unit.

He

cannot seek to avoid application of § 78-12-25.5 by isolating each
constituent of the sauna and designating it a "product."
approach

was

recently

rejected

by

the

Sixth

Circuit

Such an
Court

of

Appeals, applying a "common sense interpretation of 'improvement'"
in construing the terms of Ohio's real property statute of repose. 3
"The statute states in relevant part:
No action to recover damages . .
for bodily injury or wrongful
death, arising out of the defective
and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, . . . shall be
brought against any person performing
services
for or
furnishing
the
design, planning,
supervision of
construction, or construction of such
improvement to real property, more
than ten years after the performance
or furnishing of such services and
construction.
Ohio
Rev.Code §
2305.131."
IcL. at 112-13 (court's
omissions).

10

In Adair, supra, the plaintiff was injured by an allegedly defective conveyor on which coal was transported within a coal-processing plant.

Based upon the statute of repose, the district court

granted summary judgment to the company who had designed and built
the conveyor and the entire plant.

The Court of Appeals affirmed.

With respect to the plaintiff's claim that the conveyor itself was
not an improvement, the court wrote:
Adair has attempted to limit the focus of this
inquiry to Conveyor A, or even to the pulley
and belt involved in Adair7s accident.
Such
components are arguably in the nature of
equipment, rather than improvements.
Adair's
proposed limitation is too narrow, however. . .
[T]he nature of the conveyor can best be
understood in light of its "integral" role in
the coal handling system.
* * *

The coal handling system, which transports
raw material to processing facilities, is
essential to the operation of the factory as
designed and enhances the utility of the
property.
Id. at 114-15.

Accordingly, the court held that the component

constituted an improvement to real property, and that the plaintiff's claims were barred.
The key factor in determining whether appellant's action
arises out of an allegedly defective "improvement," rather than an
allegedly

defective

"product,"

as

appellant

contends,

is

an

examination of the heating unit's role with respect to the sauna,

11

and, in turn, the sauna's role within the Little America project.
In J. H. Westerman Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. , 499 A.2d
116 (D.C.App. 1985), the plaintiff sued for damages caused by an
allegedly defective heat-activated

"off switch."

The appellate

court affirmed judgment for the defendant based upon the applicable
statute

of

repose,4

concluding

that the

switch

constituted

an

improvement to real property:
[T]he heating system, including its component
Klixon switches, was an "improvement to real
property." The built-in heating system was an
integral part of the building, without which
the structure could not have been used for
business. . . . Furthermore, the Klixon
switches are an integral part of the heating
system.
In this case, it is undisputed that without the heating
unit, the sauna could not function.
the

sauna

appellant.

is an

It is also unquestionable that

improvement within

the definition

offered

by

Under the common sense analysis applied in the above

4

"The statute provides:
Actions arising out of death or injury caused by
defective or unsafe improvements to real property.
(a)(1) . . . [A]ny action—
(A) to recover damages for—
(i) personal injury,
(ii) injury to real or personal property, or
(iii) wrongful death,
resulting from the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, . . .
shall be barred unless in the case where injury is the basis of
such action, such injury occurs within the ten-year period beginning on the date the improvement was substantially completed, or in
the case where death is the basis of such action, either such death
or the injury in such death occurs within such ten-year period. . .
." Id. at 118.

12

cases, therefore, an action based upon an alleged defect in the
sauna heating unit necessarily arises out of a defective improvement to real property, rather than a defective product.

Conse-

quently, the action is governed by § 78-12-25.5, and the products
liability

claim

maintained.
conclusion
repose.5

apparently

anticipated

by

appellant

cannot

be

The Supreme Court of Mississippi recently reached that
in the context of a virtually

identical

statute of

In Moore v. Jesco, Inc., 531 So. 2d 815, 817 (Miss.

1988), the court held that claims against the supplier of allegedly
defective chicken house components arose out of an improvement to
real property, and thus were barred by the statute:
In Smith v. Fluor Corp., 514 So.2d 1227 (Miss.
1987), this Court held that § 15-1-41 applied
to a heat exchanger installed in a refinery
because the heat exchanger was an improvement
to real property rather than a product. . . .
In the context of the case at bar, whether §
15-1-41 protects suppliers of products and/or
materialmen becomes immaterial if the item
^ f,MCA § 15-1-41, as it existed when this action was filed,
stated in part:
No action may be brought to recover damages for
injury to property, real or personal
arising out of any deficiency in the design,
planning, supervision or observation of
construction, or construction of an improvement
to real property . . . against any person, firm
or corporation performing or furnishing the
design, planning, supervision of construction
or construction of such improvement to real
property ore than ten (10) years after the
written acceptance or actual occupancy or use,
whichever occurs first, of such improvement by
the owner thereof."
Id. at 817 (court's
omissions).
13

supplied is not a product.
Based on our
analysis in Smith v. Flour Tsic] Corp., supra,
we hold that the component parts of the subject
chicken houses constitute "improvements to real
property" and not "products." As a matter of
law, then, an action based on strict products
liability will not lie and summary judgment was
properly granted.
In this case, appellant's claims arise out of an allegedly defective

improvement

to real property.

Consequently,

the

claims are governed by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5, and are barred
by the provisions of that statute.
B.

Higham-Hilton is within the scope of
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 for all
claims arising out of the Little
America construction project.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 provides in part that an
action arising out of the allegedly defective or unsafe condition
of an improvement to real property "may not be brought against any
person performing or furnishing the design, planning, surveying,
supervising the construction of, or constructing the improvement to
real

property

construction."

more

than

seven

years

after

the

completion

of

In spite of the plain language of the statute,

appellant apparently contends that the statute includes contractors
who do not provide materials incidental to their contracts, but
does not include contractors who do provide such materials.
Appellant's attempt to create exceptions to the statute
is groundless, and constitutes an improper attempt to usurp a
legislative function.
Appeals,

To quote the District of Columbia Court of

"When Congress sought to exclude a particular class from
14

the operation of § 12-310, it did so expressly: the statute in
explicit terms excludes owners or possessors from the application
of § 12-310."

J. H. Westerman Co., supra, at 120.

Like Congress,

the Utah state legislature expressed its intent to except owners
from operation of the statute of repose.

Appellant's assertion

that the legislature failed to mention an entire class meant to be
excluded —

contractors whose bids include materials —

is unsup-

portable in light of the statute.
Appellant's argument also fails on a more fundamental
ground, however.

It has been undisputed throughout the course of

this

that

litigation

Higham-Hilton

served

as

the

mechanical

subcontractor on the Little America construction project.

In fact,

appellant has consistently characterized Higham-Hilton as such in
his pleadings and other court documents.
Appellant, p.

6)

As mechanical

(R.51, 78-81; Brief of

contractor, Higham-Hilton was

responsible for "the plumbing, heating, and the air conditioning"
for the entire Little America project.

(Deposition of Stanley

Nakamura, June 28, 1988, p. 12, lines 13-18.)
Higham-Hilton would be no less a mechanical contractor if
it provided a product in the performance of its duties on the
project.

The

principle.

court

in

Cudahy,

supra,

recognized

that basic

Holding that a particular defendant was "within the

class afforded the special protection" of the statute of repose,
the court wrote:
The October 17, 1972, agreement between Cudahy
and Ragnar Benson confirms the allegation that
15

Ragnar Benson was general contractor of the
addition to the plant, performing engineering,
architectural, supervisory and other related
services. The fact that Ragnar Benson also had
a contractual duty to supply some materials
does not take it out of the protected class.
Id. at 1215.
The result reached in Cudahy is a logical and necessary
interpretation of the statute of repose.
application
supplied

If plaintiffs could avoid

of the statute by alleging that a contractor also

products

on

a

particular

project,

the

statute

would

provide essentially no protection to a majority of subcontractors.
Bids almost always include labor and materials pursuant to the
owner's bid documents.

To exclude contractors7 protection to the

extent they provide materials necessary to fulfill their main role
as builders would eviscerate the protection of the statute and
violate the clear legislative intent.

In interpreting the statute,

this court should seek to fulfill its purpose, which is to provide
contractors and others in the building industry with some measure
of protection against long-term threat of liability.
In KSLA-TV, Inc. v. Radio Corp. of America, 501 F.Supp.
891 (W.D.La. 1981), opinion adopted in KSLA-TV, Inc. v. Radio Corp.
of America. 693 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1982), the court recognized the
need to apply a similar statute of repose in accordance with its
intended
construct

purpose.
a

radio

The

defendant

tower,

and

also

in

that

served

case
on

contracted

the

"materialmen and manufacturer of component parts.11

project

to
as

Id. at 893.

Thirteen years later, the tower collapsed and the plaintiff filed
16

suit.

The defendant moved

for summary

judgment based

upon the

statute of repose governing improvements to real property. 6

In

response, the plaintiff argued that the statute did not apply to
the defendant

in its capacities as materialman and manufacturer.

The court rejected the plaintiff's argument:
The objectives of § 2772 would be frustrated if
this court were to allow suit against Stainless
in its capacities as materialmen and manufacturer of component parts.
The statute's purpose of preventing
hardships to contractors cannot be attained if
a court allows the same claim to proceed
against the same contractor in his capacity of
materialman or manufacturer or provider of
component parts.
With these principles in
mind, this court concludes that the legislature, in enacting § 2772, could not have
intended to preempt causes of action against
contractors who do not also serve as materialmen or manufacturers of component parts, yet
allow causes of action to proceed against
b

"§ 2772.
Pre-emptive period for actions involving deficiencies in design, supervision or construction of improvements to
immovable.
A.
No action whether ex contractu, ex delicto or
otherwise, to recover on a contract or to recover damages shall be
brought against any person performing or furnishing the design,
planning, supervision, inspection or observation of construction or
the construction of an improvement to immovable property:
(1) More than ten years after the date of registry
in the mortgage office of acceptance of the work by owner . . .
B.
The causes which are pre-empted within the time
described above include any action: . . .
(1) For any deficiency in the design, planning,
inspection, supervision or observation of construction or in the
construction of an improvement to immovable property;
(2) For damage to property, movable or immovable,
arising out of any such deficiency;
(3) For injury to the person or for wrongful death
arising out of any such deficiency . . . "
Id. at 892.
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contractors who do serve in such dual capacities.
Id. at 897-98.
A similar attempt to isolate a defendant's role within a
larger project was addressed in Hilliard v. Lummus Co., Inc., 834
F.2d 1352 (7th Cir. 1987).

In Hilliard, the Seventh Circuit Court

of Appeals noted that a defendant's status under a statute of
repose must be determined by viewing "as a whole11 the defendant's
role in the construction project.

The plaintiff in that case was

injured by an allegedly defective screw conveyor used to move cocoa
through a cocoa processing plant.
"modernize"

the

plant,

the

defendant

changes in the screw conveyors.
repose governing

As part of his contract to
had

recommended

certain

Based upon the Illinois statute of

improvements to real property,7

the district

court granted summary judgment for the defendant, and the Seventh
Circuit affirmed, stating:
Hilliard's focus on the screw conveyor alone
ignores the true nature of the Lummus Co.'s
work for WFC. Lummus did suggest improvements
in the screw conveyors, but also directed a
1

"Section 13-214(b) [of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure]
provided that:
No action based on tort, contract or
otherwise may be brought against any
person for an act or omission of such
person in the design, planning,
supervision, observation or management of construction, or construction
of an improvement to real property
after 12 years have elapsed from the
time of such act or omission. . . . "
Id. at 1354.
18

broad spectrum of improvements to the plant's
cocoa-processing system.
The appropriate
inquiry is whether the whole of Lummus's work
for WFC amounts to an improvement of real
property. For example, in a case involving a
plaintiff injured by a loose exterior brick,
the question whether section 13-214(b) would
apply to the architect of the building would
not turn on whether the brick was an improvement to real property, but rather on whether
the entire building was an improvement to real
property.
Id. at 1356.
The same conclusion is compelled under the wording of
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5.

Furthermore, denying application of §

78-12-25.5 to contractors who also supply products would appear to
contradict the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute.
On page 17 of the legislative history attached as an addendum to
this Brief, Senator Buckner noted that the statute was needed
because

protection

was

currently

unavailable

to

"contractors,

subcontractors, suppliers, engineers or architects . . . "
sis added.)

(Empha-

From that language, it appears that even suppliers who

do not participate in construction efforts might also have been
intended to be within the scope of § 78-12-25.5.
Hilton's

role

as

mechanical

contractor

on

the

project, however, that issue need not be addressed.
fact

that

project

Higham-Hilton's

was

mechanical

primary

contractor

role

in

mandates

the

Given HighamLittle

America

The undisputed
Little

America

application

of the

statute, regardless of whether it also supplied a product in the
course of its performance.

19

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, respondent Higham-Hilton
requests the Court to affirm the order of summary judgment entered
below.
Dated this "SPw^ day of May, 1989.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.

By

"-TSAAA^j \ - ( ^
Lee C. Helrming
Karra J . P o r t e r
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HOUSE BILL #4

l

(78-12-25.5)

THE READING CLERK:

Page 1

House Bill #4 by Representative

2

Phil Meecham and read:

3

Subsection .5, Utah Code annotated 1953 relating to the

*

limitations of action by providing a time limit within

5

which action for injury to property or death must be

6

brought against persons who performed or furnished the

7

design, planning, supervision or construction of

8

improvements on real property.

9

Enacting a new section 73-12-25.5,

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State

10

of Utah, Section 1, section 78-12-25, Subsection .5.

U

Utah Code annotated 1953 is enacted to read:

12 |] Subsection .5.

73-12-25

No action to recover damages for any

13

injury to property, real or personal, or for any injury

14

to the person or for bodily injury or wrongful death

15

arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an

16 II improvement to real property, not any action for damages
17 li sustained on account of such injuries shall be brought
lfl || against any person performing or furnishing the design,
19 II planning, supervision of construction or construction of
20 II such improvement to real property more than 4 years after
21 || the completion of construction.

(1)

Person shall mean

22

an individual, corporation, partnership or any other

23

legal entity.

24

mean that that time when the last material

(2)

Completion of construction shall

Page 2

has b e e n f u r n i s h e d and the last labor
i n c l u d i n g all n e c e s s a r y

performed

small jobs i n c i d e n t a l to the

3 II c o m p l e t i o n of c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s and
4 (J to m a k i n g the i m p r o v e m e n t
use.

s u i t a b l e for its

incidental
intended

The l i m i t a t i o n imposed by this p r o v i s i o n

shall

6 II not apply to any p e r s o n in a c t u a l p o s s e s s i o n and

control

7

as o w n e r , tenant or o t h e r w i s e of the i m p r o v e m e n t at the

8

time the d e f e c t i v e and u n s a f e c o n d i t i o n of such

9

improvement constitutes

the p r o x i m a t e cause of the

10

for w h i c h it is p r o p o s e d to bring an a c t i o n .

11

p r o v i s i o n shall not be c o n s t r u e d as e x t e n d i n g or

injury

This
limiting

12 I] the p e r i o d s o t h e r w i s e p r e s c r i b e d by the laws of this
13

State for the b r i n g i n g of any a c t i o n .

14

M r . S p e a k e r , your C o m m i t t e e on B u s i n e s s

and

15 II C o m m e r c e to w h i c h w a s r e f e r r e d House Bill #4 by
16

R e p . Hill et a l , l i m i t a t i o n of c e r t a i n a c t i o n s has

17

c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d said bill and r e p o r t s the same out

18

f a v o r a b l y with the f o l l o w i n g a m e n d m e n t s .

19

after the word " t h e n " delete the w o r d " f o u r " and add the

20

word "seven".

21

" t h e n " delete the w o r d " f o u r " and add the w o r d

22

R e s p e c t f u l l y , R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Frank V, N e l s o n ,

23
24

I

Repeat:

THE C H A I R :
committee

report.

Page 1, line 10,

Page 1, line 10, a f t e r the w o r d

M r . S p e a k e r , I m o v e we adopt

"seven".
Chairman.
the

Page 3

1

A VOICE:

2

Moved and seconded to adopt the

committee report,

3

THE CHAIR:

All in favor, say aye.

(aye)

4

say no. Committee report is adopted.

5

before you and the Chair will recognize the chief

6

sponsor of the Bill/ Representative Hill.

7

REP. HILL:

Opposed

House Bill #4 is

Before we get too far into this, there

8

has been passed an amendment which we propose to make in

9

the beginning of line 14.

10
H

This amendment was written up

before we had the new line delineations on the Bill, and
I so the top two lines are a little bit in error.

But the

12

amendment is to begin, will replace the subsection 2,

13

beginning at line 14, with the information that is going

14

to be passed out just prior to the convening time at

15

2 o'clock.

16

it with the one written, "Completion of construction for

17

the purposes of this act.shall mean the date of issuance

18

of a Certificate, of substantial completion by the owner,

19

architect, engineer or other agents, or the date of the

20

owner's use or possession of the improvement on real

Delete that entire paragraph there and replace

21 II property."
22

||

THE CHAIR:

It's been moved and seconded that we

23

amend House Bill #4 by replacing subsection 2 with the

24

new subsection as just read.

All in favor of the motion
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1 I say aye.
2

(aye)

is amended.

3

REP.

Opposed say no.

So ordered.

The Bill

Representative Hill.
.HILL:

The reason for this is to get a little

4

more clear meaning of this particular phrase, completion

3-

of construction as opposed to the one that was written,

6

originally written in the Bill.

7

recognized principle of law -- Ifm not a lawyer, I guess

8

1 shouldn't be speaking for all these lawyers -- but

9

there is a recognized principle of law that holds that

We have a more less

10

at some point there is a necessity for a time to be

11

established when rights and obligations must be settled.

12

Now this is recognized in the fact that we have many

13

statutes of limitations defined by statute and law that

H

states that action in certain causes and certain cases

15

must be brought before a certain date.

There is a limit

16

beyond which action cannot be brought.

Well, this is a

IT

very sound and practical principle and itfs also a good

18

business principle because at some time there must be a

19

point at which obligations are considered settled.

20

you f ve made an error or you've made a mistake, as a

21

natural course, they're not held against you forever in

22

most

23

tural field this is not so, as defined so far as

24

definition in the statutes are concerned.

cases.

However,

in t h e e n g i n e e r i n g

and

If

architec-

Pa

II

Se 5

1

The work that an engineer, an architect or contractor

2

or supervisor performs by statute can be held against

3

him for his entire life, and in some cases, have been

4

brought against the estate of the man after he is

5

deceased.

6

Now it's recognized that that are some things

7

that might enter into this from the standpoint that if

8

you take away some -- if you give rights in one place,

9

then you have to take them away from some other place.

10

This is probably so, but you must make, you must

U

determine then, which will be for the good and best of

12

all concerned*

13

it's been brought to our attention across the nation

14

that it seems like we f ve become a suit-conscious people

15

to the extent that when an action is brought everyone

16

that had any connection with it, even sometimes down to

17

the janitor, have been entered in as a party to the

18

suit*

19

many engineering and architectural people where action

20

has been brought years and years after they have completed

21

their service, the facility has been in use and a cause

22

for at least proposed negligence has been brought and

23

the person who is responsible for the construction of

24

the building in the original instance has been named as

Now in this particular matter we have,

This has been true of many engineering firms and
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1 || a party to the suit.

Usually these have been able to

2

be cleared but not until much time and energy has been

3

extended on the part of that person that was responsible

4 (I for that design*
Now the fact that at some time this cutoff
6

should be is recognized also in the Court because in

7

|| some instances, in any kind of a suit, if the matter is

8

|| too long past, they'll dismiss it because it's a stale

9

case.

Witnesses, memories, records are so far in the

10 || time past that it's difficult to establish testimony, to
11 II establish some of the things that might be necessary for
12 || a Court determination in these, and these have been
13

dismissed on this fact because they ruled there had been

14

as a matter of equity in justice no attempts to rule on

15

those.

16

bit different area in our legal field, in the fact that

17

most actions start from the time they have been discovered

So this Bill, while it does get into a little

18

|| or could have been discovered.

19

II tion.

This is the usual limita-

This Bill says that the limitation shall start

20 || from the time that the facility is completed or has been
21

|| turned over to the owner or user, whoever the work was

22

being performed for.

23

for four years, which is a usual, which has been done in

24

many o t h e r S t a t e s but w e ' r e w i l l i n g

The original Bill is written up

to go w i t h t h i s

7-year
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1

II program*

In some States it's more and in others, it

2

is less*

3

have many States that have enacted similar legislation

4

Now this type of proposal is not new*

We

J] recognizing the problem that it's created by having
people on the hook, so to speak, for their entire

6

II lifetime,

I'll list you briefly the ones that have

7

enacted statutes in this same area:

Idaho, Illinois,

8

Louisiana, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina,

9

Ohio, Tennessee, Virginia and Wisconsin*

Idaho being

10

the last, they passed one at their last Special Session

11

just a year ago*

12

tion to the people that are involved in the construction

13

and design business that this type of thing might be

14

enacted*

15

has some other areas to bring in on the legal side of

16

the thing and an explanation of the "why" of this Bill.

17

I'd entertain any questions and any answer concerning

18

questions that may be in the minds of some of the

19

representatives on the floor*

And so we're asking for this considera<

I think Mr* Meecham, Representative Meecham,

20

THE CHAIR:

21

(Inaudible)

22

Rep. Arbuckle?

23
24

Is there a question?

REP. ARBUCKLE:
a question?

Representative Hill will yield to

Page 3

I II

REP. ; E L L :

2.

REP* A R B U C K L E :

Z

Yes, sir*
You were mentioning some of these

other States that have enacted this type of l e g i s l a t i o n .

4 I) What is the length of time most of them have for the
time they're held accountable for?
6 II

REP. HILL:

I can read those.

Idaho set theirs

7

at 9 y e a r s ; Illinois at 6 y e a r s ; Lousiana at 10;

a

M i n n e s o t a 10; New Hampshire, 6; North Carolina 6;

9

Ohio 10; Tennessee 4; V i r g i n i a 5; and W i s c o n s i n

10

We're about in the same a r e a .

11

REP. ARBUCKLE:

12

THE CHAIR:

13

House Bill 4?

Representative

R E P . SIMPSON:

15

REP.

17

No further q u e s t i o n s .

Are you ready for the question on

14

16

6.

HILL:

Simpson.

Will Rep. Hill yield to a question?
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Hill will yield to the

question.
REP* SIMPSON:

In reference to other a g e n t s , would

18

these be other agents of the owner or the architect or

19

the engineer, the way this has been written?

20

R E P . HILL:

The owner in some cases can have a

21

superintending, a construction supervisor who would be

22

authorized to do t h i s .

23

So anyone -- someone would be authorized to make a

24

signature regarding this certificate of

This would be agent of either.

completion.
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1

REP. SIMPSON:

May I question further, Mr. Speaker?

2

HEP. HILL:

3

The biggest difficulty was between the owner and

State your question.

4 I the engineer that the engineer1s agents release the
engineer from this contention?
THE CHAIR:

Rep. Hill?

REP. HILL:

Let me clarify the one point concerning

this completion of construction.

This is a standard

document used in the construction trade but not always,
and just merely recognizes that the facility has been
completed.

This doesn't relieve anyone from any action.

It just indicates that the facility has been completed
according to whatever prearranged agreement was made
and that certain work has now concluded.
REP. SIMPSON:
REP. HILL:

One final question, if I may.

State your question*

REP. SIMPSON:

Have you ever known, Representative

Hill, of a case where an owner got fed up, shall we say,
in waiting for these people to finish his home, and by
necessity because his other home has been sold, had to
move into this building incompleted and this then would
cut him off?
THE CHAIR:

Representative Hill.

REP. HILL:

There are probably some circumstances

Page 10

involving this that are surely true, to the extent
that a contractor and owner relationship is probably
not on firm ground in the beginning, where perhaps this
could be.

The mere fact that he has taken possession

would indicate that some other arrangements had been
made, I would presume, but I don't think we could cover
all of these situations by this particular statement*
THE CHAIR:
House Bill 4?

Are you ready for the question on

Rep. Carr.

REP. CARR:

Will Representative Hill yield?

THE CHAIR:

Submit the question.

REP. HILL:

I f ll yield.

REP. CARR:

I had a couple of questions.

As I

understand the Bill, the 7-year statute of limitations
would apply, regardless of the question of when the
defective condition was discovered.
REP. HILL:

This is correct.

REP. CARR:

Now as I understand, I f m not well

acquainted with a statute of this type, but I understand
that in some States, some of the laws provide that the
time runs from the discovery of the defect or when it
comes to light?
REP. HILL:

This is the usual pattern of action

limitations as I understand it.

This is a departure
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1
2

from that pattern,
REP. CARR:

Well, as I read the last paragraph,

3

the next to last paragraph, as I understand, the limita-

4

tion does not apply to the person in actual possession

5

at the time the building was constructed,

6

REP* HILL:

The time any action might be brought

8

REP* CARR:

Well suppose --

9

REP* HILL:

Is in actual possession at the time

7

forth.

10

the defective or unsafe condition of such improvement

11

was discovered.

12
13
14

REP. CARR:

Well how do you interpret that?

That's the thing I'm getting at.
REP. HILL:

The purpose of that particular

15

statement was the fact that if action, as I understand

16

it -- as I say I'm no lawyer -- but if action was brought

n

against -- by someone who was injured on the same

18

property because of an unsafe condition, if he didn't

19

state that the owner was not exempted by this provision,

20

then he would be scot-free.

21

negligence on his part, but the Bill would preclude the

22

addition of the engineer, designer or contractor as a

23

third party to the suit, additional parties.

24

owner would still -• anyone would still have action

It might be due to his

But the
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against the owner or the one who had possession or
control of the property at the time this unsafe
3

II condition may have caused a problem,

4

I

REP, CARR:

Well, back to this question of the time

the defect is discovered.

I'm not an engineer, and I

don't -- it seems to me that it might be -- I think
7

there should be a statute of limitations on this type of

S

action because -- there should be limitation on every

9

kind or most every kind of cause of action or legal

10 |j liability, but I wonder about, if you're not giving the
n

II public a little more protection if you don't provide in

12 II there, if you should not provide that a limitation period
13

II run from the time the defect is discovered*

I wonder

14

what the committee, what your thinking on that was, for

15

instance if you shorten the period from 7 years to say

16

2 years or 3 from the time the defect or faulty condition

17

was actually discovered?

18

REP. HILL:

As I understand it, the present

19

statute would apply on that basis, and this law is

20

asking for a departure from that in that the limitation

21

would begin from the time of the completion of the

22

services.

23
24

Now, this is not completely without precedent,

|| although it is a new concept as far as the General
Statute of Limitations is concerned.
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1

R E P . CARR:

2

so m u c h

3
4

I

time

7

This

REP- CARR:

As

would be no

10

take

for

if the d e f e c t

instance,
this

or

if

collapsed

statute

there

liability.
T h e r e w o u l d b e no l i a b i l i t y
the o w n e r w o u l d

to

the

still

be

liable.
REP. CARR:

owner,

13

to

right.

I understand,

e n g i n e e r or the c o n t r a c t o r ;

11
12

is all

if the b u i l d i n g

REP. HILL:

held

sorry

—

II 8 y e a r s a f t e r c o n s t r u c t i o n , u n d e r

3
9

it, Ifm

I understand

REP. HILL:

the i n j u r y ,
6

As

T h e r e w o u l d b e no l i a b i l i t y

t h e e n g i n e e r or the a r c h i t e c t
REP. HILL:

Right.

Unless

t y p e of t h i n g s w o u l d

of c o u r s e , a f r a u d ,
Ifm

these

still h o l d

15

there h a d b e e n

16

this.

17

would preclude primarily

18

propositions.

I might

19

little further

if I m a y .

20

testing

21

has b e e n f u r n i s h e d ,

22

or o m i s s i o n s , the team of the d e s i g n e r ,

23

the c o n t r a c t o r

24

such as y o u ' r e all f a m i l i a r w i t h , the one

factors

I donft believe h e f s

of the design

and

third

this one

capabilities

enter

that

this

party

thing just a
there

is a

of the design

if there are any m a j o r

should be able

into

s c o t - f r e e , but

any of these

W e feel

s u r e , if

that could

relieved

clarify

the

contractor?

14

some o t h e r

to

time
that

errors

the o w n e r

to u n c o v e r

any m a j o r

and
ones,

concerning
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the Savings & Loan Building on Main Street.

The error

there in the combination of things that entered into it
showed up immediately because they had some beam failures*
This type of thing, the figure or main thing that the
7-year period is a time test of anything that could be
of significance*

There might be some minor, I don't

think any of us are perfect.

When you say that anything

would be perfect after passing a 7-year period, but we
feel that the 7-year time test is adequate to protect
the public in this case and give repose and relief to
the peaceful attitude of the designer who knows not now
he's held forever for that design and can be brought in
as part of the suit should one occur.
REP* CARR:

Thank you.

THE CHAIR:

Thank you Rep. Hill.

Rep. Wheeler, do

you have something you'd like to add?
REP. WHEELER:

I'd just like to add, Mr. Speaker,

as a member of that committee, we discussed this with
Rep. Meecham and it came into question of fraud or
criminal negligence and it was his -- as I understand
the interpretation, that this wouldn't eliminate any
charges of fraud and criminal negligence in the design
of the building.

That comes under a separate statute,

is that right, Rep. Meecham?

II
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l

REP. MEECHAM:

2*

THE CHAIR:

That is correct.

Are you ready for the question?

3

Any question on House Bill #4?

4

Clerk will call the roll on House Bill 4.

5

THE CHIEF CLERK:

The Chief

Agard (aye); Anderson, G.T. (aye)

6

Anderson, R . C

(aye); Arbuckle. (aye); Bagley (aye);

7

Behennan (aye); Benson (no); Bitner (aye); Brady (aye);

8

Bronson (aye); Brock (aye); Darver (aye); Cannon (aye);

9

Carling (inaudible); Christenson (yes); Cox (aye);

10

Darter (aye); Day (inaudible); Dennis (aye); Drake (aye);

11

Eskelson (aye); Fisher (aye); Frost (inaudible);

12

Fowler (aye); Frost (inaudible); Gilman.

13

THE CHAIR:

14

REP. GILMAN:

Rep. Gilman wishes to explain his vote.
Mr. Speaker, I think it would be nice

15

if they'd forgive all our mistakes in 7 years, but I

16

don't think they should be any more excused than the rest

17

of us.

I vote no.

18

THE CHAIR:

Representative Gilman votes no.

19

THE CHIEF CLERK:

Halliday (aye); Halvorsen

(aye);

20

Harding (inaudible); Howard (yes); Hill (yes);

21

Hodgkinson (no); Holt (aye); Hunter (aye); Hebrey (aye);

22

Jack (yes); Jones (yes); Holton (aye); Latham (yes);

23

Lingaard (aye); Levrge (inaudible); Ludwig (no);

24

Mather (no); Meecham (yes); Mitchell (aye); Nelson (no);
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Neilson (aye); Oberhansley

(no); Paste (no); Peetreson

(inaudible); Plamp (inaudible); Powell (no); Priest (no);
3

Praden (aye); Reese (aye); Regis (aye); Russell (inaudible);

4

Sanders (aye); Spivey (inaudible); Sumption (no); Tire

5

(no); Thurston (no); Wooter (no); Young

6

(aye).

Mr* Speaker*

7

THE CHAIR:

(Pause)

House Bill #4 having received

3

53 yes votes, 12 no votes, 4 absent and not voting, has

9

received a constitutional majority.

(Pause)

10

#4 having received 53 yes votes, 12 no votes,

11

4 absent and not voting, has received its constitutional

12

majority and should be transmitted to the Senate for

13

their further action.

14

House Bill #38*

The Reading Clerk will now read

15
16

SENATE

17

(inaudible) Next 53-12-25.5

18

,

19

^^^

(inaudible)

(inaudible)

ru%j}|r./rll/tin

^lie'-dfflQ-aHJmenft wis. ^ot
f a v o r say a y e .

to the committee

(aye)

Opposed?

(inaudible)

Carried.

The

21

House Amendments w i l l be found on t h e 25th day i n t h e

22

House Journals, 25th day in the House Journals, page 13.
IS W a r e US
House Bill 7^4
(inaudible)

23
24

SENATOR BUCOER:

Mr. President?
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Senator Buckner.
SENATOR BUCKNER:
,•/

...

Mr. President we believe the

<•

3

law that -ha a booa- presented to you is one fchTa-fc—p-i.uviJ^'Sir

4

for a statute of limitations for an area of our industry

5

and our economy that has not formerly been completely

6

covered by the law.

7

some 15 or more laws that are of a limitation nature

3

covering broad groups of action.

9

specific statute ottererf fur frln1 reasonable protection

Utah statutes today include

However, there is no

10

of building industry, contractors, subcontractors,

11

suppliers, engineers or architects and they're now liable
JJt u*V* -t3«TW tbo&t
basically for a lifetime for these action^-. -And rhi.s

12
13
14

fin a&** &N«Jj;*3
-1 e g i a 1 ati&&==:$rnvijjejs l i a b i l i t y f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y
cm

or

15

building defects * • be brought by 5, 10, 20, 30, 50, to

16

100 years after the building basically has been completed.

17

In the interest of the 25 year old building, most of

18

those involved with design and construction, JjTe„Lluiydeceased or retired, if retired, and they can be

19

completely innocent.

20

cauJJ be-

They must, however, go through the

I expense of defending any action to prove their innocence*, JL.
^

21

Building (in*
Inaudible)

22

time and therefore you

23

industry believes that (inaudible)

24

are willing to accept the 7-year situation as being

(inaudible)

.

The

four years but
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1

consistent with other limitations.

May I without

2

prolonging debate just quickly point out to you that

3

our statute of limitations now provides six years for

*

acting on a written contract, four years for acts on

5

an oral contract and three years on trespass, injury

S

to property, fraud and estate, liability created by

7

statute, 7-year statute for repossession of real property.

8

So this is consistent with that,

9

you also that other states who have recently re-enacted

I would point out to

10

the statute of limitations:

Idaho passed 9 years,

11

Illinois 6 years, Louisiana 10 years, Minnesota 10 years,

12 I New Hampshire 6 years, North Carolina 6 years, Ohio 10
13 II years, Tennessee 4 years, Virginia 5 years, and Wisconsin
14
o tv4

15
0*

16
17
18
19

20
•21

heirs could even be brought in*p an action where there
is no limitation based upon the fact that when people
sue for damages if a building has something happen to
it, they sue everyone they can get their hands on legally.
And this means the builder, the architect, the owner,
the former owner, and anyone they can legally sue.

22 || Consequently, I think the Bill is logical and consistent*
23 || I would not want to prolong debate (inaudible) questions a+U Aai/«.
24

frhii}•• n \ 7 a l o t m o r e i n f o r m a t i o n

i f t h e nlfljaflLog^ o f t h e
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body would like to go into it further, but in the
interest of time, I think that basically, Mr, President,
explains the bill..
Tire CLHTIK:

Any further discussion on House

Bill #4?
H^rrnhndiblo^—.
Are you ready for the question?
All those in favor say aye (aye).
Carried,

Opposed?

House Bill #4 having been read the second time,

the question is shall House Bill #4 be read the third
time?

Roll call.

(Inaudible)

fie*

*i*iel*i

*ktt+

*»* ">W

House Bill #4 shows 23 ayes, no nays, (5 absent.
Having received a constitutional majority «*d the
bill passes and will be referred to (inaudible)

House Bill

0?

House Bill 0 3

(Inaudible)

House Bill #4 for discussion,
Are you ready for the question?
aye.

(aye)

Opposed?

(Inaudible)

All those in favor say

Motion carried.

House Bill #4

having been read the third time and that's the final
passage.

The question is shall House Bill #4 pass?

(inaudible)
House Bill #4 shows a final passage, 18 ayes,
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1

no nays, 10 absent.

Having received a constitutional

2

majority, the bill passes and will be signed by the

3

President and the

4

after which it will be transmitted to the House for

(inaudible)

5 I the signature of the Speaker of the House.
6
7
S
9

